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The authors assess impacts of rural road rehabilitation 
on market development at the commune level in rural 
Vietnam and examine the variance of those impacts and 
the geographic, community, and household factors that 
explains it. Double difference and matching methods are 
used to address sources of selection bias in identifying 
impacts. The results point to significant average impacts 
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on the development of local markets. They also uncover 
evidence of considerable impact heterogeneity, with a 
tendency for poorer communes to have higher impacts 
due to lower levels of initial market development. Yet, 
poor areas are also saddled with other attributes that 
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1 Introduction 
  The literature on rural roads and economic development has emphasized impacts 
on transport costs and prices, and the consequent welfare impacts.  For example, rural 
roads may allow farmers in remote (and often poor) rural areas to get higher prices for 
their output, and/or reduce the prices they face for inputs and consumer goods.
1  However, 
this way of thinking about the impacts of rural roads says little or nothing about how rural 
roads might also influence the geography of economic activity and, in particular, what role 
road improvements might play in local market and market-related institutional 
development.   Initial conditions in remote poor areas are often characterized by highly 
geographically incomplete and non-existent markets. The goods concerned are simply not 
available in these areas, given high transport costs. Advocates of rural road projects often 
point to their potential benefits in stimulating market development (Gannon and Liu, 
1997).  Rigorous evidence appears to be non-existent. 
Here it can be important to distinguish two ways in which access to markets can 
improve due to better transport infrastructure.  One is through reduced travel costs to 
existing markets and institutions.  The other is through the induced relocation of markets 
and institutions.  The rural road impacts literature appears to have the first in mind, at least 
implicitly.  But markets are mobile ─ not least so in developing countries.  One response 
to road improvements could be the development of local markets defined as fixed places 
where villagers and outsiders gather at set times to buy and sell goods. 
  Why should we care about whether the residents of a poor area have goods 
commercially transported to their community and available in a local market, rather than 
                                                 
1  For example see Gannon and Liu (1997); Khandker, Bakht and Koolwal (2008); Escobal and Ponce 
(2004); Dercon, Gilligan, Hoddinott and Woldehanna (2006); and Lokshin and Yemtsov (2005).   3
travel themselves to an outside market?  At a purely descriptive level it may be of interest 
to know how road improvements affect the geography of economic activity.  Does 
economic activity become more geographically concentrated or less so as roads improve?  
There may also be important instrumental reasons.  While it should not be presumed that 
local market development is welfare enhancing, supportive arguments for that view can be 
made.  One possible reason is that there could be large external benefits to having a local 
market.   
There are two relevant literatures here.  The economic geography literature has 
postulated that externalities ─ agglomeration economies ─ play a crucial role in the spatial 
concentration of economic activity.
2  A local market’s physical presence and facilitation 
of trade could be an instigating factor in a process of shifting production structures to 
more diversified and higher value activities, improved access to various services, and 
broader economic development in an area.  Such benefits are external in the sense that 
decisions by the commercial carrier to transport goods to the community or not will not 
take them into account.  Local market development may then create a virtuous circle 
whereby the stimulation of off-farm development and new income earning opportunities 
result in higher perceived returns to education and in time, higher schooling.  We will dub 
this the hypothesis of “transport-induced local-market development (TILD).” 
  A second set of reasons for believing that local market development brings local 
benefits is found in the (largely non-economics) literature on the role of local markets as 
fora for the exchange of ideas and learning, recreation and social interactions (Skinner 
                                                 
2  The now classic contribution is Krugman’s (1991) “new economic geography” model in which one sector 
of the economy is subject to increasing returns to scale and is (hence) non-competitive.  At the same time 
the new economic geography literature doesn’t pay much attention to rural transport improvements and 
there has been little effort to link these literatures.   4
1964, 1985; Liu 2007; Masschaele 2002, among others). This literature emphasizes local 
markets’ role in social change and in connecting isolated rural peasant communities to the 
external social and economic system. Others have written about the importance of trust 
and relationships in exchange as might be expected to be fomented in local rural markets 
(for example, Fafchamps and Minten 1999).  These are about both production 
consequences as well as non-economic benefits of social development.   
  However, it is far from clear that public investments in transport improvements 
will actually promote local market development in poor areas.  In its analysis of where 
economic activities take place and why, the new economic geography insists on increasing 
returns to scale leading to agglomeration economies.  This may make it hard for markets 
to develop in poor areas even with large reductions in transport costs.  And as we show 
later with a simple model, theoretical arguments can be made that road improvements 
could either be good or bad for local market development. Under certain conditions, they 
will encourage local market development; under others, road improvements could 
discourage it as local residents in the targeted areas can now more easily reach established 
markets. 
  Do new roads linking poor isolated rural areas to the outside world promote local 
market development and under what conditions?   Despite a general consensus on the 
importance of rural roads, there is surprisingly little hard evidence, for or against, TILD. 
We know rather little about the size and nature of the impacts of transport improvements 
on local market development, about the contextual factors that influence such outcomes, 
or the conditions that encourage TILD.     5
  This paper aims to test TILD by assessing the impacts of a World Bank-financed 
rural road rehabilitation project implemented in Vietnam between 1997 and 2001.
3  
Numerous observers of the rural Vietnam setting have remarked on the correlations 
between road infrastructure, local markets, and off-farm income diversification (for 
example, see various chapters in Kerkvliet and Porter 1995; Bryceson et al. 2006; Minot 
et al. 2006 ).  And indeed, the project’s objectives were to develop local market activity 
and hence economic development through targeting road improvements in poor 
communes.  The pre-project setting can be described as one of isolated subsistence-
oriented villages with generally poor market related infrastructure ─ a legacy of the 
communist period that suppressed markets, and of their slow development since the State 
and the farming collectives relinquished control of the economy in the late 1980s (Fforde 
and de Vylder, 1996).  Continuing restrictions on mobility, the lack of safety nets and the 
threat of losing land that is left uncultivated, render households in these areas relatively 
immobile.  In similar areas of China local markets have been described as providing a 
meeting place to engage in trade, business and social interactions for small scale 
cultivating households scattered over large areas (Skinner 1985; Liu 2007).  Itinerant 
traders and assemblers can buy small quantities from peasants while the latter find needed 
outside goods and services (Luu 2003).   Yet, unlike similar rural areas in China where 
village and township enterprises have played a vital role in rising off-farm diversification, 
rural Vietnam has had no such tradition. The role of local markets may be 
commensurately more important there.    
The paper focuses on whether the road improvements lead to the development of 
local markets and whether there are also impacts on off-farm development that may be 
                                                 
3  The Vietnam Rural Transport Project I, see World Bank (1996) for details.   6
consistent with the idea of a virtuous cycle as discussed above. Our data and methods 
allow us to assess this in a methodologically rigorous way ─ controlling for how road sub-
projects are allocated to specific communes and for initial conditions that may affect 
subsequent outcome trends, and monitoring communes long enough to capture impacts. 
  The paper concentrates on three sets of questions.  The first concerns average 
impacts on local market development of the rehabilitation of rural roads.  The World Bank 
project coincided with a period of rapid economic development in Vietnam.  Access to 
markets of various kinds increased substantially over the study period.  How much of the 
change observed in communes covered by the project can be attributed to the road 
intervention?  A further, related issue is how impacts vary over time.  If the transport cost 
saving is large enough and the types of expenditures and agglomeration effects noted 
above are present, then we would expect impacts of the roads project to increase over 
time.  Existing evidence on this point is scarce.
4  Our data allow us to test if that is the 
case. 
  Our second set of questions concern cross-commune differences in the project’s 
impacts on local markets and what explains those differences.
5  Heterogeneity of impacts 
can be expected to arise according to the economic, social and political characteristics of 
the community where the road intervention is placed.  We aim to test for heterogeneity 
and try to identify the key contingent factors relevant to impacts.   
  In this context, a potentially important issue for project design is whether higher 
levels of initial development enhance or diminish impacts.  Should we be targeting places 
                                                 
4  In one of the few cases in which impacts of a poor area development project (including rural roads) were 
tracked over time, the impacts declined over time rather than showing cumulative gains (Chen, Mu and 
Ravallion, 2007).    7
that are well endowed and have the market institutions necessary for further economic 
development on the grounds that impacts will be higher there, or focus our resources on 
the places without such attributes?  In practice, it appears that project selection often tries 
to favor poor areas with poor road conditions.  Poor places tend to have less market 
development to begin with.  This alone would suggest greater potential for roads to have 
impacts on market development in poor areas.  But poor areas are typically also saddled 
with attributes that may well prevent markets from being attracted to those areas. The 
degree to which poor road conditions coincide with other important bottlenecks to 
increased development and market activity ─ such as poor agro-climactic endowments, 
low population density, low education levels, high risk, and less well functioning credit 
and other markets ─ will clearly mediate impacts of road improvements across 
communities.  There is no obvious reason why placement in poor areas with poor roads 
will maximize TILD. Depending on precisely how road benefits depend on initial 
conditions, project design may also need to consider complementary inputs and policies to 
achieve the full potential benefits from the road.   
This leads to our third set of questions, which concern the structure of the cross-
commune differences in impacts.  It is well recognized, in principle at least, that the same 
intervention can have different impacts on different places and households, depending on 
their characteristics.  However, when there are multiple outcomes of interest and they 
cannot be aggregated into a single outcome (as is often the case in project evaluation) the 
policy implications of such heterogeneity depend crucially on whether it shares a common 
structure across different outcome variables.  For example, if communes with better 
                                                                                                                                                    
5  While impact heterogeneity has received surprisingly little attention in the context of rural roads, it has 
been emphasized in social sector programs; see, for example, Galasso and Ravallion (2005).   8
educated households tend to derive larger impacts for improved access across all kinds of 
markets, then a robust conclusion can be drawn about the gains from targeting such 
commune covariates.  If the relevant sources of cross-commune differences in impacts 
vary greatly across multiple outcomes then it will clearly be hard to exploit heterogeneity 
to assure better projects.  
Section 2 develops a simple model to show that the impacts of better roads on 
local markets are theoretically ambiguous.  Section 3 then provides a brief description of 
the project being evaluated, our data and initial conditions in our sample of rural 
communes.  Section 4 discusses our methods for evaluating impacts and exploring cross-
commune differences in impacts.  Section 5 discusses our results, while Section 6 offers 
some conclusions. 
 
2  Roads and local market development 
  When will a local market exist and when not?  How will this differ between poor 
areas and non-poor areas?  How will the presence of a local market be affected by a road 
improvement project?  Before we address these questions empirically, it helps to outline a 
simple theoretical model.  
  We assume that trade exists but that whether or not a market exists in a specific 
rural area (“commune”) depends on the difference between the cost of freighting traded 
goods to that area from a central market and the cost to residents of the commune going 
instead to the central market to shop, and bringing the goods back themselves.  The two 
costs will differ if the value of travel time for commune residents differs from the wage 
rate for the commercial freight carrier for the traded goods.  There can also be differences   9
in the non-labor cost, notably when there are economies of scale, such that the unit 
transport cost is lower for the commercial carrier given the bulk of the goods transported. 
  To formalize these ideas in a simple model, let w be the wage rate for the 
commercial carrier and v be the value of time for local residents; we can think of value of 
time as a function of various characteristics (x) of local residents, as v(x).  Also let t denote 
travel time from the commune to the central market.  Travel time is a strictly increasing 
function of the straight-line distance from the commune center to the central market d, and 
whether the road improvement project (D=0, 1) is implemented; travel time with the 
project is  ) 1 , (d t  and it is  ) 0 , (d t  without the road project, and of course  ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( d t d t  .
6  
The project also lowers the non-wage cost of transport for the commercial carrier; the road 
improvement reduces wear and tear on transport equipment and may also allow cheaper 
modes of transport to be feasible.  The non-wage cost to the commercial carrier is  ) 1 ( c k  
with the project and  ) 0 ( c k  without it, with  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( c c k k  .
7  Local residents who travel to 
the central market also incur a non-wage cost,  r k , but this is assumed to be small 
() 1 ( c r k k  ) and to be unaffected by the road improvement.     
The market exists in a given commune if (and only if) the commercial carrier has 
the cost advantage; otherwise it would be cheaper for the local residents to travel to the 
central market.  The roads project reduces labor costs for both the carrier and the local 
                                                 
6  Note that t will of course also be a function of terrain and typology such as location in mountainous areas. 
7  In a more general model, one could also allow  c k  to vary with d. This could stem from wear and tear on 
transport equipment ( c k rises with d) or economies of scale ( c k falls with d).  One might also allow for an 
interaction effect between d and D in influencing c k .  As long as the marginal effect of d on  c k is small, the 
above results will still hold. 
   10
residents, and it reduces non-labor cost for the commercial carrier.  The cost advantage of 
the commercial carrier is: 
 ) ( ) , ( ] ) ( [ ) , , ( D k k D d t w x v x D d C c r       (D=0,  1)    (1) 
When 0 ) , , (  x D d C  the commercial carrier can transport goods more cheaply than local 
residents and so the local market will exist; the opposite is true when 0 ) , , (  x D d C .  Let 
d* denote the critical distance at which 0 ) , *, (  x D d C ; d* is a function of D and x.  The 
impact of the project on the cost advantage of the commercial carrier is: 
   ) 1 ( ) 0 ( )] 0 , ( ) 1 , ( ][ ) ( [ ) , 0 , ( ) , 1 , ( c c k k d t d t w x v x d C x d C        (2) 
  Now consider three cases: 
  (i) A “low-income commune”, defined as one in which w x v  ) (:  t h e  c o s t  
advantage of the commercial carrier falls with distance ( 0 ) , , (  x D d Cd ), so that local 
markets are found up to distance d*, but not at more remote places.  It can be seen from 
equation (2) that the road project will increase the cost advantage of the commercial 
carrier, so it will increase the probability of having a local market at any given distance. 
The value of d* will rise and the project will promote local market development. 
  (ii) A “middle-income commune”, defined as one in which 
)] 0 , ( ) 1 , ( /[ )] 0 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( d t d t k k w x v w c c      .  The fact that  w x v  ) (  implies that the cost 
advantage of the carrier rises with distance ( 0 ) , , (  x D d Cd ); local markets will tend to be 
found at higher distances from the central market. Given that 
)] 0 , ( ) 1 , ( /[ )] 0 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( d t d t k k w x v c c     , the project will increase the cost advantage of 
the commercial carrier at any given distance. Thus the value of d* will fall and the project 
will promote local market development.      11
  (iii) A “high-income commune”, defined as one in which 
w d t d t k k w x v c c      )] 0 , ( ) 1 , ( /[ )] 0 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( .  Again the cost advantage of the carrier 
rises with distance, so that local markets are not found close to the central market, but now 
the project reduces the cost advantage, d* increases and local markets retreat.  The project 
displaces markets at middle distances and leads to fewer local markets.   
We can summarize the empirical implications of these observations as follows. 
The poorer the commune the more likely the project will promote local market 
development.  There is also likely to be a potentially complex interaction effect between 
how poor the commune is and its distance from the central market.  Among poor and 
middle-income communes the impacts on local market development will tend to be at 
middle distances, while among the relatively high income communes, it is the negative 
impacts that will tend to be higher at middle distances. In all three cases above, the 
outcome will depend on the characteristics of local residents (x), as these determine the 
value of their travel time. 
   
3  The project, data and setting 
3.1  The rural road project intervention 
The Vietnam Rural Transport Project I (RTPI) aimed to link commune centers to 
markets, stimulate market development and reduce poverty through the rehabilitation of 
5,000 kilometers of rural roads (World Bank 1996).  The project was implemented 
between 1997 and 2001 in communes located in 18 provinces scattered around Vietnam.  
Participating provinces were responsible for choosing communes for inclusion in RTP1, 
as well as the road links to be rehabilitated within them.  On paper, road links were   12
identified through least cost techniques, and eligible if the road’s zone of influence had a 
population of over 300 per kilometer, and average rehabilitation costs were below $15,000 
per kilometer.
8  In mountainous communes with a high density of ethnic minority 
households, provisions were made for the possible waiving of the population and cost 
criteria.  In practice these eligibility criteria identify considerably more road links than 
could be covered by the project.  How the included links were selected among these is 
unclear.  It should be noted that the selection of project communes was complete prior to 
the project start date and based on conditions in early 1997.  
Many of the targeted roads were in very bad condition, some with impassable 
sections year round.  A rehabilitation standard of ‘reliable access’ was enforced that 
provides relatively consistent and safe access with only short-term road closures (due to 
bad weather).  The project expressly stipulated that no ‘new’ roads would be built.     
Aid or central government spending for road projects may substitute for local 
government spending intended for the same purpose, by being diverted to other sectors or 
to neighboring non-project areas.  Elsewhere we have ascertained that the project did 
produce differential impacts on the kilometers of improved roads in project compared to 
non-project comparison communes (van de Walle and Mu 2007).  We found no evidence 
that resources were diverted to non-project communes for roads or other basic 
infrastructure.  However, we also showed that project funds were used not only to 
rehabilitate roads as intended by the project, but also to build new roads.  Therefore, the 
impacts we study in this paper are due to both types of improvements.     
                                                 
8  Least cost techniques refer here to the minimum cost engineering solution that ensures a certain level of 
motorized passability.   13
Using the methods to be described in Section 5 we have also checked to see 
whether the period under analysis was marked by differences in the implementation of 
other development projects in the project and non-project communes.   For a long list of 
potential interventions for which information is available in our data, we find no evidence 
that project or non-project communes were treated differently.
9  Based on the findings, we 
are confident in attributing any differences in outcome changes over time to rural road 
rehabilitation and construction. 
3.2 The  SIRRV  data   
  Collected specifically for evaluating the impacts of the rural roads rehabilitated 
under RTPI, the "Survey of Impacts of Rural Roads in Vietnam" (SIRRV) consists of a 
panel of 200 communes and 3000 households.  The survey design implicitly takes the 
commune as the project’s zone of influence.  This is justified by the project objectives ─ 
namely to link commune centers (where key social, economic and administrative facilities 
are located) with road and market networks ─ and because the commune is an 
enumeration level at which data is commonly collected in Vietnam.   
  The baseline was collected pre-project starting in June 1997, while subsequent 
rounds followed in the summers of 1999, 2001 and 2003, tracing the implementation 
process and schedules of prior rounds.  The analysis for this paper makes use primarily of 
the first and last rounds, though we will also test impact dynamics using the 2001 round.   
  Project (“treatment”) and non-project (“comparison”) communes, and households 
within them, were surveyed in six of the 18 provinces participating in the project ─ Lao 
                                                 
9  We looked at education, health care, family planning, child nutrition, reforestation, opening up new land, 
anti-opium, job creation and TV and radios distribution programs, as well as various schemes that are part of 
the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Program, including credit loans, school fee and health care 
exemptions, free land allocation and new infrastructure.     14
Cai and Thai Nguyen in the north, Nghe An and Binh Thuan in the center, and Kon Tum 
and Tra Vinh in the south of the country.
10  Project communes were randomly selected for 
inclusion in the survey from province-specific lists of all communes with road links 
proposed for rehabilitation.  Another list was drawn up of remaining communes in 
districts with proposed road links from which a random sample of non-project communes 
was drawn. The eventually sampled communes (100 project and non-project each) were 
located in 29 of 38 potential survey districts. 
Non-project communes located in the same districts as the treatment communes 
will share many of the same characteristics as the project communes.  But we additionally 
use matching techniques to ensure selection of the most appropriate comparison 
communes.  Districts are large and the distances between project and non-project 
communes tend also to be large.
11 Contamination from project to non-project communes 
is unlikely for the type of small localized road improvements under study.        
The commune data were acquired in part by drawing on annually collected 
commune records. Each commune appoints a ‘statistician’ who collects and maintains 
commune-level information such as pertaining to vital statistics, land use and distribution, 
production activities and finances. There is some concern that the reliability of these data 
varies according to average commune income and education, and local pressures to 
compile statistics that conform to pre-determined ‘plans.’  To minimize such potential 
problems, we focus on variables likely to be less vulnerable to these biases.  Our analysis 
focuses on commune level impacts and uses primarily the commune data.     
                                                 
10 Lao Cai, Thai Nguyen or Nghe An are located in what was previously known as North Vietnam or the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
11  Early on during data collection, we mapped many of the non-project communes and judged them to be 
sufficiently far from our road links to be confident that contamination is unlikely.   15
Fifteen households in each sampled commune also answered a household 
questionnaire.  A welfare ranking implemented by commune authorities was used to 
divide households into the poorest, middle and richest thirds of each commune’s 
households.  Five were then randomly selected from each of these equal sized groupings.
12  
The household ranking is undoubtedly subjective, but stratified sampling on this basis 
should ensure a sample that is reasonably representative of each commune’s socio-
economic groups.   
The household survey does not attempt to measure household income or 
consumption expenditures.  However, using extensive information on household 
characteristics common to the SIRRV and the nationally representative Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey (VLSS) of 1998, we use regression techniques to predict consumption 
expenditures for SIRRV households in 1997.
13 This variable is then aggregated to form a 
commune level welfare indicator which we use in Figure 1 (Section 3.3) and to divide 
communes into those below and above median mean predicted consumption, which we 
will refer to as poor and non-poor communes, respectively.
14        
Finally, a project level database detailing what the project did, when and how, was 
also constructed for each surveyed project area.  Project differences can then be taken into 
account in determining impacts.  
3.3  Initial conditions of poor and non-poor communes 
  Pre-project, 48 percent of all sample communes had a market whose frequency 
                                                 
12  Since the groups were equal and equal-sized samples were drawn from each, weights are not required for 
constructing commune level variables from the household data. 
13  The consumption model includes 80 explanatory variables (not counting 58 province dummies) and has 
an R
2 of 0.687.  Mean consumption for the 1998 VLSS rural sample is 2515.605 thousand dongs (with a 
standard deviation of 1467.065), and mean predicted consumption for 1997 SIRRV households is 2332.896 
(with a standard deviation of 1110.707).  Full details are available from the authors.   
14  This is the only variable used in the paper that is built up from household level information.     16
averaged once a week.  67% were open air with no building; a quarter of the market 
buildings were of brick, while the rest were described as “temporary.”  The market areas 
ranged from 72 to 2500 square meters.  The vast majority had been built recently and 
since the collapse of the collective farming system.  Figure 1 shows how the initial 
presence of a commune market was related to both the commune’s distance to the closest 
central market town and its average living standards as measured by mean predicted 
household per capita consumption in the baseline.
15 
16  Panel (a) plots the relationship 
between having a market (vertical axis) and commune mean consumption on the 
horizontal axis for communes classified into three equal groups based on distance to the 
closest large market town ─ within 7 kilometers (“close”), between 7 and 15 km 
(“middle”) and further than 15 km (“far”).  Panel (b) places distance on the horizontal axis 
instead and plots the relationship separately for communes above (“non-poor”) and below 
(“poor”) median consumption.    
  Figure 1 suggests a clear relationship between these three variables, corroborating 
elements of the theoretical model outlined in Section 2.
17  Local markets are most often 
present at middle distances (Figure 1, Panels a and b).  They are an increasing function of 
predicted consumption except at very close distances and high consumption levels (Panel 
a).  For better-off communes the relationship with distance is a pronounced inverted U, 
while it is much flatter for poor communes although starting out at a somewhat higher 
level for those at very close distances (Panel b).  Poorer communes are less likely to have 
markets than better-off communes at all distances beyond short distances (Panels a and b).      
                                                 
15  Distance to the closest market town is defined as the distance to the closest large town. 
16  These are non-parametric regressions, using locally weighted smoothed scatter plots, in which the unit of 
observation is the commune.   17
  Table 1 examines how communes below and above median consumption 
expenditures differ in their initial characteristics ─ including (in the bottom half of the 
table) the market and market-related development outcome indicators that we will focus 
on.
18  The table reveals considerable and highly significant differences in attributes across 
communes disaggregated in this way.  Poorer communes are associated with 
characteristics that are typically assumed to be disadvantageous, including higher 
illiteracy, worse access to transportation and credit, larger distances to the closest city and 
far lower market presence. They have generally lower levels of population and road 
densities, larger minority populations, and are more likely to be in mountainous areas.   
  Focusing specifically on the baseline values of the outcomes variables, we see that 
in addition to having lower market presence, poorer communes typically have 
significantly fewer commercial businesses, inferior access to services, less diversified 
income sources and worse schooling indicators.  For example, only 32% had any kind of 
market, and small shops or stalls which typically sell a few basic necessities such as salt, 
matches and soap, were present in only 39%.  The probabilities that better off communes 
had markets and shops were 63 and 57%, respectively.  In 1997, an overwhelming 
majority of households in these communes relied primarily on agriculture for their 
livelihoods (90%) but the lack of income diversification was even more pronounced in the 
poorer communes where 94% did so compared to 86%.   Finally, less than a quarter of 
children completed primary school by age 15 in the poor communes and only three 
quarters of these continued on to secondary school.  In the non-poor communes it was 36 
and 92% respectively.   
                                                                                                                                                    
17  The best fit for these data was obtained from the product of two quadratics ─ in consumption and in 
distance ─ which gave uniformly significant (at the 5% level) coefficients and an R
2 of 0.27.    18
  These differences again raise the crucial policy question of whether road 
placement in poor areas with poor initial conditions will handicap or stimulate TILD. The 
rest of the paper explores whether the project had impacts on these outcome indicators and 
how differences in initial conditions may have interacted with road improvements to 
affect those impacts.          
 
4 Evaluation  methodology 
  The official project selection criteria detailed in Section 3.1 clearly allow 
provinces considerable freedom in choosing communes and road links.  Some may aim to 
direct the project to poorer communes with important rehabilitation needs, while others 
may aim for communes with greater economic potential.  Either way, the placement of the 
project is unlikely to have been random and may well have been influenced by factors that 
also determine outcomes.     
  A potentially important source of endogeneity bias in this context is that initial 
conditions are likely to determine project placement as well as to influence the subsequent 
growth path and prospects of the communes (as emphasized by Jalan and Ravallion 1998).    
Our evaluation methodology aims to correct for these potential sources of selection bias. 
  We combine a difference-in-difference (DD) with propensity score methods 
(PSM).  A conventional DD gives unbiased estimates based on the assumption that the 
selection bias is constant over time.  However, if there are time varying factors that 
influence placement, then road placement is still correlated with the error term in the 
differenced equation. To allow for the possibility of time variant selection bias due to 
initial observables, we use the predicted probability of participating in the road project 
                                                                                                                                                    
18  The variables are defined in the notes to Table 1 when they are not self-explanatory.   19
(the propensity score) to match the comparison communes in the DD estimate.  PSM is 
implemented using a logit that includes initial conditions that may affect subsequent 
commune trajectories as explanatory variables.  Our impact estimates are then constructed 
by comparing the before and after project change in outcome measures for the project 
communes with those for the matched comparison communes.   
  Specifically, the average impact for project communes (DD) can be written as  
     
P N
P i N DD DD /        ( 3 )  
where 









i i Y Y W Y Y DD                                      (4) 
is the impact estimate for commune i, P and NP denote project (treatment) and non-




i Y Y 0 1   is the change in the outcome 




j Y Y 0 1   is the change in the outcome measure for 
comparison commune  j, and  ij W is the weight given to the  j
th commune in making a 
comparison with the i
th project commune.  P N in equation (3) is the total number of 
project communes.  We apply nonparametric kernel matching in which all the non-
participants are used as comparison communes and weights are assigned according to a 
kernel function of the predicted propensity score following Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997).  This technique ensures valid bootstrapped standard errors (Abadie and Imbens   20
2006).  As a robustness check, we also construct a PS-weighted DD (Hirano, Imbens and 
Ridder 2003; Hirano and Imbens 2002).
19 
  The key assumption of PS-matched or weighted DD in this context is that the 
selection bias is conditional on the observed placement covariates in the baseline.  The 
estimates will be biased if there are unobservables that affect both project placement and 
outcome changes.  Since all project communes were selected prior to the project start date 
based on initial conditions as reflected in our baseline, we need not worry about latent 
factors that might influence changes both in road placement and outcomes over time.  In 
the logit model used to calculate the propensity scores, we control for an array of initial 
conditions that may subsequently affect changes in the communes. However, we can 
never rule out the possibility of omitted initial conditions that are correlated with 
placement and outcome changes over time. 
  To explore whether and how initial commune conditions affect impacts we use a 
simple OLS regression of the estimated commune specific impacts against certain key 
initial commune characteristics.  For this exercise we use the PS matched estimates since 
these can be estimated for each specific commune.       
  
5  Impacts on local market development and their heterogeneity  
5.1  Participation in the project 
The probability of a commune’s participation in the project is estimated using a 
logit model.  The detailed results, including a list of the initial commune characteristics 
included in the logit are reported in an Appendix available from the authors and in van de 
                                                 
19 For the theory of propensity score matching and propensity score weighting, see Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) and Hirano et al. (2003), respectively. For an empirical application in the same setting, see van de   21
Walle and Mu (2007), so we only summarize them here.  We find a number of significant 
explanatory variables for program placement.  Consistent with official selection criteria, 
communes with a higher total population and a larger share of ethnic minority population 
were more likely to participate in the project.  Communes in Thai Nguyen, Nghe An, and 
Binh Thuan were more likely to get the project than communes in Tra Vinh.  A few 
characteristics that may indicate higher living standards or local development had a 
significant negative effect on the probability of participation ─ namely, the share of the 
adult population working in private enterprises, the school enrollment rate and having an 
Agricultural Bank branch.  Yet, other proxies for income had no effect ─ including, the 
presence of a market and predicted average commune consumption expenditures.  Finally, 
among measures of transport and accessibility, a national road passing through the 
commune, the presence of passenger transport, a higher density of roads, and a higher 
distance to the province center all reduced the probability of participation, while a railroad 
passing through the commune improved it.  As there is imperfect overlap in the estimated 
propensity score for project and non-project communes, we limit the sample to the 
common support, ending up with 94 project and 95 non-project communes for the rest of 
the analysis.  Using the predicted propensity scores to match communes, we achieve a 
close balancing of the initial observed commune characteristics for the two samples.
20     
5.2 Average  treatment  effects 
We assess impacts of the road project on a set of outcome variables (introduced in 
Table 1) that we deem relevant to local market development and to testing TILD.  In 
                                                                                                                                                    
Walle and Mu (2007). 
20  Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), we carried out a balancing test using the standardized mean 
difference ─ the difference in covariate means in project and non-project communes as a percent of the 
standard deviation in the full sample. This drops significantly from 14% before to 9% after matching.   22
addition to the presence and frequency of local markets, we examine whether the presence 
of other commercial establishments ─ namely shops, bike repair shops, pharmacies, and 
restaurants ─ was affected.  Such impacts could both be direct or via impacts on local 
markets.  To test whether there are signs of a process consistent with lower transport costs 
and market development stimulating a more diversified local economy we also examine 
whether there are effects on the availability of various services and signs of livelihood 
diversification, such as away from agriculture and towards trade and service activities.  
Finally, we check to see whether school enrollments are affected, as might be the case if 
the perceived returns to education have been altered.  
Table 2 displays the mean values of these indicators across project and non-project 
communes in the baseline and for subsequent survey rounds.
21  These generally moved in 
the expected direction over time, with a tendency to increase over the period in both 
project and non-project communes.  The key question then is whether there was a 
differential impact attributable to the road improvements in the project communes.   
Table 3 presents DD estimates of the mean impacts using the PS-based kernel 
matching and weighting methods discussed in Section 4, as well as simple DD estimates.  
The estimates are given for two time periods ─ namely, 1997 to 2001 and 1997 to 2003, 
referred to as the short and medium term. Under our assumptions, these estimates reflect 
causal effects of the road improvements. One or two stars indicate whether each change is 
significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels respectively.   
                                                 
21  With the exception of market frequency, the employment and the school enrollment variables, other 
variables are dichotomous so that the numbers are interpretable as probabilities that communes have the 
outcome.    23
By the start of data collection for the 2001 round, 27 months had elapsed on 
average since the project work ended.
22  How long it takes for impacts to emerge is an 
issue that often arises in discussions of road impacts and planning for their evaluation.  
Here we are able to ascertain whether local area impacts were different in 2001 from those 
in 2003, after two more years had elapsed.  
Focusing on the PS-based estimates, and starting with impacts by 2001, we see 
that across the examined indicators there is no sign of statistically significant mean 
impacts in the short term. The only exception is for the primary school completion rate 
which rose by 15 to 25 percent, according to the kernel matched and PS-weighted DD 
respectively.  Why would better roads affect primary school completion rates?  Although 
all communes have primary schools, secondary schools are considerably rarer.  It is 
plausible that a road improvement now allows children to more readily reach a secondary 
school which will encourage both primary school completion and post primary 
enrollments. 
The results change when we track impacts through to 2003.  A number of outcome 
indicators now exhibit significant impacts. As a result of the road improvements, markets 
became newly available in close to 10 percent more project than non-project communes 
over the 7 years, and their frequency increased.  However, despite small positive impacts 
on commercial establishments, none are statistically significant.   
By 2003, we also discover significant impacts of the road project on the services 
for which we have data ─ the availability of tailoring and hairdressing services.  The 
weighted DD show that the probability of men and women’s hair dressing services being 
                                                 
22  The 2001survey was fielded about 4 months after all projects were completed. About 11% of project 
communes had finished their road project less than one year before.    24
available in the communes rose by 14 and 20% respectively in 2003.  Consistent with 
effects on market and services availability, we find evidence of impacts on employment 
and livelihood patterns.  Improved roads resulted in a small but significant 2 percent 
decline in households relying on farming as their main source of income.  A significant 
increase in the share of households mainly relying on the service sector (1.7%) hints at 
what alternative livelihoods these households may have switched to.  This is not a trivial 
impact given that only one percent of households were employed in the service sector in 
the baseline. The impact on households engaged primarily in trading activities is also 
positive but small and statistically insignificant.  Finally, impacts on the primary school 
completion rate are sustained over time and have even risen slightly.  Moreover, small 
effects on secondary school enrollments also appear to be emerging. 
In sum, we find some support for TILD.  Our results indicate significant average 
impacts on the development of local markets, both their presence and frequency.  The 
project resulted in households switching from agriculture to non-agricultural, mostly 
service-related activities, and tailoring and hairdressing services became more commonly 
available.  These impacts were not sharp and short-lived; they took time to emerge, only 
appearing in 2003, and are thus rising over time.  This is all we can say based on our two 
data points.  Of note too are the quicker, sustained and robust impacts on primary school 
completion rates. 
5.3  Heterogeneity in impacts 
  As implied by our theoretical model, the average treatment effects may hide 
significant heterogeneity across communes.  Using the PS-matched DD method and 
focusing on the 2003 data, we calculate the individual treatment effects for each of the 94   25
project communes. Eyeballing these confirms that they vary substantially across 
communes.  Furthermore, calculating mean impacts separately for the 47 communes 
below and above median predicted household consumption reveals pronounced 
differences in impact estimates between relatively poorer and less-poor project 
communes.  Particularly striking is that impacts are generally larger for the poorer 
communes.  Normalizing impacts by each group’s mean value of the variable in the 
baseline, we find that for 10 out of the 14 outcomes the impacts for the relatively poorer 
communes exceed those for the better off ones.
23     
  The characteristics associated with whether a commune is poor or not are likely to 
interact with roads to influence their impacts.  One popular hypothesis is that benefits are 
highly dependent on local human capital endowments needed to take advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by new roads.  But, our finding that impacts are larger in poorer 
communes where, as we saw in Table 1, illiteracy is also typically higher, appears to 
contradict this common argument. Other hypotheses can be suggested, such as that 
historical discrimination against certain social and economic groups makes it harder for 
them to adopt more outward economic orientation, as required to take advantage of new 
roads.  Our result of generally higher impacts in consumption poor communes that also 
tend to have worse attributes begs for analysis of the role of initial conditions in 
determining road impacts.  
  To explore the covariates of road impact estimates, we use OLS regressions where 
the dependent variables are the commune level impact estimates and the explanatory 
variables are initial pre-project commune characteristics for the sample of 94 treatment 
                                                 
23  Khandker et al. (2008) also find larger impacts for the poor although their analysis is carried out at the 
household level.     26
communes.  Potentially important, mediating physical, social and economic commune 
conditions, that we also observe, include most of the variables listed in the top half of 
Table 1.  To these we add location in the country’s north ─ which has had a far shorter 
experience with the market economy.  We include the initial value of the dependent 
variable/outcome measure, as well as whether the commune had a local market pre-
project, as a test of the virtuous cycle idea.  Finally, to represent heterogeneities in the 
actual treatment we also include quadratics in the number of months since project 
completion and in the length of improved road.
24  In principle one can imagine all sorts of 
relationships and non-linearities between these project attributes and impacts. Time may 
enhance impacts as local providers take time to set up or it may reduce them as customers 
come to value access to outside providers.  Under increasing returns to scale, one would 
expect cumulative impacts with more time leading to higher impacts.   
  The interpretation of road length is a bit unclear though it is still probably better to 
control for it as it represents an important difference in treatment.  Typically, the project 
rehabilitated what was necessary to make the road link functional.  Length is thus likely to 
reflect some omitted characteristic about how bad road access was prior to the project.  It 
is probably not interpretable as road length per se but most likely proxies for the road’s 
initial condition and omitted attributes of remoteness.  
  Tables 4 through 8 report the results.
25  For each outcome variable we present two 
regressions: one with a full set of the same initial conditions (model 1) and one the result 
                                                 
24  We leave out transportation access and road density as they are highly correlated with other explanatory 
variables that we judge more important and we are limited in degrees of freedom. We also exclude measures 
of social services as there is little variance across communes.  
25  Note that the fact that the dependent variables are estimated does not invalidate the parameter estimates 
or their standard errors.  The estimated impact is the true impact plus an error term that ends up in the 
composite regression error.  The overall predictive power falls but the estimates are still valid.   27
of a cumulative pruning of the highly insignificant variables (t-statistics below one), 
starting with the lowest t-ratio (model 2). This serves to sharpen the picture somewhat, 
given multicollinearity.    
There are significant interaction effects, indicating that impacts are the result of 
how the attributes of places and people interact with what the project does.  Some 
attributes consistently raise or reduce impacts, while a few are both complements and 
substitutes to better roads in inducing local market development. 
We note first that impacts are consistently and significantly reduced for communes 
with a higher initial value of the outcome variable.
26  These are some of the largest effects 
both in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients and of their statistical power.  This 
strongly suggests decreasing impacts ─ whereby marginal returns are higher when 
outcomes are initially lower.  This is consistent with our earlier finding that impacts tend 
to be higher in poorer communes.   
As anticipated, several commune attributes that are widely deemed to be 
disadvantageous, consistently dampen the impacts of improved roads, although not 
significantly across all outcomes.  For example, as we would expect, higher adult 
illiteracy rates reduce the impacts of road improvements on a number of market related 
outcomes ─ the presence of commercial establishments, the availability of services and 
secondary school enrollments ─ consistent with human capital and infrastructure being 
                                                 
26  Given the number of commune attributes and outcomes, the discussion here focuses on the estimated 
coefficient signs rather than their magnitudes. The coefficients indicate how each attribute affects the road 
project’s impact on the probability of having a market or a related indicator (in the case of dichotomous 
variables), or its impact on the percentage change in employment or enrollments.  For example, in the 
markets regression (Table 4), the coefficient on the initial value is -0.27 ─ meaning that the probability 
across communes that better roads lead to new local markets is reduced by 27% by having a market in 1997.  
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complements.  On the other hand, illiteracy strengthens road impacts on the share of 
households who remain farmers.   
A greater distance to the closest market town significantly lowers impact on the 
availability of pharmacies, tailoring and women’s hair dressing services, specialization of 
households into the service sector and secondary school enrollments.  The last probably 
reflects the fact that distance to secondary schools is closely correlated with distance to 
the market town.  As expected, impacts are also generally lower for communes located in 
the North where entrepreneurship and markets have been less developed historically. 
A high concentration of ethnic minority households, controlling for a mountainous 
location and education levels, results in significantly lower impacts on many of the same 
outcomes including markets and their frequency, the availability of services and 
continuation on to secondary school.  This too may reflect the fact that many minorities 
have less of a tradition of using markets or relying on public services due to a culture 
molded by past discrimination; this is broadly consistent with the arguments and evidence 
of van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) on the sources of ethnic inequality in Vietnam.   
Other commune characteristics have almost exclusively positive effects on the 
impacts of improved roads.  The initial presence of a market in the commune typically 
significantly enhances road impacts on other market related development consistent with a 
story of external benefits to local markets and the hypothesis of TILD.  Unsurprisingly, 
initial market presence particularly enhances impacts on the establishment of retail and 
other small firms, and trading activities.  It also significantly increases impacts on primary 
school completion rates.     29
Population density is typically a project placement criteria as indeed it was for 
RTP1.  Impacts and marginal returns are expected to be higher in more densely populated 
communes.  We find supportive evidence for this with respect to impacts on shops and 
women’s hair dressing services.   More households with motorcycles indicate the degree 
to which households can rapidly take advantage of the road for their transport needs, 
although it may also capture an income effect.  Plausibly, we find that it enhances project 
impacts on the development of off-farm activities and secondary school enrollments.   
A number of other commune attributes interact with road improvements to both 
raise and reduce impacts depending on the outcome indicator.  An often cited bottleneck 
to development is lack of credit.  We find evidence for this with respect to the 
development of local markets.  However, credit availability appears to reduce road 
impacts on household diversification into trade and service sector activities.  Credit has 
been found to be more readily available to landed households engaging in agricultural 
pursuits in rural Vietnam (Ravallion and van de Walle 2008, chapter 7).  Its availability 
may well coincide with other discouragements to trade and service sector activities.   
A high prevalence of weather shocks and presumably a higher incidence of 
episodes of commune inaccessibility significantly reduce the impacts of road 
improvements on the availability of shops and school enrollments at the secondary level.  
Against this, it raises impacts on primary completion rates and on the share of households 
relying on the service sector for their livelihoods.  Location in mountainous areas also 
reveals ambiguities in its impacts across outcomes.  It significantly increases road impacts 
on local market development and the availability of tailoring services, reinforcing our 
intuition that, holding other attributes constant, poor road conditions represent a key   30
constraint to market development in mountainous areas.  Yet, mountainous location also 
interacts with the project to reduce the percentage of households who derive their 
livelihoods from farming and services as well as the primary completion rate.   
The number of months since project completion has both positive and negative 
impacts on a number of service-related indicators.  Restaurants are more likely to develop 
as more time elapses.  More months also have a positive though decreasing impact on the 
share of households relying on the service sector.  On the other hand, the longer the 
period, the lower the impact on the availability of tailoring services.  Road impacts on 
women’s hair dressing are also first negatively affected by more time passing but this is 
reversed after around 50 months have gone by.  Finally, the length of improved road is 
significant in a number of cases but, as anticipated earlier, its interpretation is unclear.           
 
6 Conclusions 
We have studied the impacts of rural road improvements on local markets and 
market-related development at the commune level in Vietnam.  In particular, we have 
endeavored to test whether impacts are consistent with a hypothesis of “transport-induced 
local market development (TILD).”  A simple theoretical model is first proposed that 
suggests that impacts on local markets are a priori ambiguous and will depend on 
commune level characteristics.  Our empirical methods then combine a double difference 
estimator with propensity score matching on pre-intervention covariates.  We examine 
average impacts, including the time it takes for them to emerge and whether they rise or 
fall over time, but also the cross-commune differences in impacts, and the nature of those 
differences, including interactions with initial geographic, community and household   31
characteristics.  In this context, we focus on two specific questions that are vitally 
important from a policy view point, to see what implications there might be for future 
project design.  Are road impacts enhanced or weakened by initially poor local market 
development as is typical in poor areas?  Are the covariates of road impacts congruent 
across outcomes?  These issues have tended to be ignored by the recent literature on 
assessing rural road impacts.  
There are indications of significant average impacts on the development of local 
markets and related indicators.  Few outcomes responded rapidly to the new and improved 
roads.  Most impacts are not apparent 27 months (on average) after project completion, 
and only emerge in data collected two years later.  We find significant average impacts on 
the presence and frequency of markets and on the availability of various services.  The 
project also resulted in households switching from agriculture to non-agricultural, mostly 
service-based, activities.  Perhaps most notable, the project had significant, early and 
sustained impacts on primary school completion rates.  These results give qualified 
support for the hypothesis of TILD.  
However, it is clear from our findings that TILD oversimplifies the process.  Our 
findings point to substantial heterogeneity in the effects on market development.  The 
circumstances of a project’s location influence its impacts.  On the whole, poor communes 
tend to experience higher impacts on many indicators of market development. This is the 
outcome of two broad sets of attributes of poor areas that tend to work in opposite 
directions to influence the impacts on local markets of road improvements.  On the one 
hand, poor areas are less likely to have markets and market-related institutions and 
services and this alone means more scope for road improvements to help develop those   32
same institutions and services.  On the other hand, poor areas have various other attributes 
that tend to discourage TILD.  For example, poor communes in Vietnam are more likely 
to have a high share of ethnic minorities and high illiteracy rates which are both uniformly 
negative in their effects.  They are more isolated and have lower population densities, 
attributes that also tend to lessen road impacts.  They are less likely to initially have a 
local market which impedes development of other market-related institutions and services 
in response to road improvements (separately to the fact that markets are more likely to 
develop in places where they do not exist initially).  Hence, we find signs of a virtuous 
cycle effect whereby the impacts on small businesses, service availability, trade activities 
and primary school completion rates are enhanced by the initial presence of a market. 
Our results thus suggest that, on balance, the road project tended to have larger 
impacts on market development in poorer communes due largely to the initially lower 
market development in these places.  This was strong enough to outweigh the fact that 
poorer communes have other attributes (besides low initial market development) that 
reduce impacts of road improvements.     
The structure of the cross-commune heterogeneity in outcomes is driven by the 
initial state of market development tempered by a number of commune attributes in a way 
that tends to follow distinct and predictable patterns across outcome indicators.  Distance 
to central markets, low population density and high minority populations, high adult 
illiteracy and location in the North all consistently dampen road impacts.   
  These findings can be exploited by project design to promote larger development 
impacts. They suggest that small road improvement projects such as RTP1 could have 
vastly larger impacts on local market development if they were targeted to places with   33
initially lower market development, and equally important, accompanied by 
complementary social and economic policies aimed at improving certain attributes (e.g. 
adult literacy) or reducing the disadvantages of others (policies to reverse the effects of 
historical discrimination towards ethnic minority groups) that interact with roads to reduce 
their impacts.     
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Figure 1: Presence of a commune market in the baseline 
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Note: These are non-parametric regressions, using locally weighted smoothed scatter plots. The unit of 
observation is the commune.  One third of all communes are ‘close’ or within 7 kilometers of a central 
market; the ‘middle’ distance third are between 7 and 15 km from the market; while the ‘far’ communes are 
more than 15 km from the market. Non-poor and poor communes are defined as those above or below the 
sample median commune per capita consumption based on aggregated predicted household consumption.    38
Table 1: Mean baseline characteristics and outcome variables for communes classified by 











Baseline commune characteristics       
Typology: mountain  0.70  0.33 0.38** 5.55 
Distance to closest central market (km)  15.53  9.39  6.14**  4.64 
Share of households owning motorcycles  0.06  0.09  -0.03*  -2.77 
Population density  2.01  5.50  -3.48**  -6.67 
Ethnic minority share  0.66  0.20  0.47**  10.03 
Adult illiteracy rate  0.25  0.04  0.21**  7.34 
Flood and storm prevalence  0.60  0.62  -0.03  -0.35 
Credit availability  0.01  0.07  -0.06**  -2.17 
North provinces  0.54  0.68  -0.14**  -2.01 
Transportation accessibility  0.23 0.31 -0.08*  -1.76 
Road density  0.01  0.03  -0.01**  -3.47 
Baseline market related outcome variables         
Market availability  0.32  0.63  -0.31**  -4.50 
Market frequency  0.72  1.45  -0.73**  -4.12 
Shop 0.39  0.57  -0.18**  -2.59 
Bicycle repair shop  0.53  0.88  -0.36**  -6.03 
Pharmacy 0.34  0.74  -0.40**  -6.12 
Restaurant 0.23  0.44  -0.21**  -3.21 
Women's hair dressing  0.32  0.48  -0.16**  -2.27 
Men’s barber  0.42  0.75  -0.32**  -4.92 
Men and women's tailoring  0.51  0.81  -0.30**  -4.71 
% farm households   93.94  86.27  7.67**  3.59 
% trade households   1.16  1.69  -0.53*  -1.74 
% service sector households  0.71  1.05  -0.33  -1.10 
Primary school completion (<15)  0.24  0.36  -0.12**  -4.40 
Secondary school enrollment rate  0.75  0.92  -0.17**  -4.71 
 
Note: The sample consists of all 200 communes.  ** significant at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% 
level.   Flood and storm prevalence summarizes the average incidence between 1997 and 2003; Credit 
availability averages dummy variables for the availability of credit from the following sources: the 
Agricultural Bank, commercial banks, the Bank for the Poor, credit coops/ people’s credit funds, 
government programs, mass organizations, international projects and NGOs; Transportation accessibility 
averages dummy variables for the presence of provincial and national roads, railways and waterways.   
Many outcome variables are dichotomous referring to whether the outcome is present in the commune.  The 
exceptions are: market frequency which takes the values 0 for no market, 1 for once per week or less, 2 for 
more than once a week, 3 for permanent market; the % of households in various occupations refers to their 
main source of income; the primary completion rate is defined as the share of children 15 and under who 
completed primary school; the secondary school enrollment rate is the share of children who graduated from 
primary school in the previous year who are enrolled in secondary school.  39
 
Table 2: Outcome variable means  
    1997 2001 2003 
    project non-project project non-project    project non-project 
Local market development 
Market  0.51 0.44 0.57 0.51 0.62 0.46 
Market  frequency    1.13 1.05 1.29 1.20 1.43 1.16 
Shop  0.63 0.59 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.77 
Bicycle  repair  shop  0.76 0.65 0.80 0.78 0.87 0.81 
Pharmacy  0.62 0.58 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.52 
Restaurant  0.35 0.33 0.50 0.41 0.52 0.44 
Services availability        
Women's  hair  dressing  0.38 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.66 0.53 
Men's  barber  0.59 0.58 0.72 0.68 0.85 0.75 
Men and women's tailoring  0.65  0.66  0.82  0.72  0.84  0.77 
Employment: % households whose main occupation is:               
Farming   89.53  90.67  89.65 91.07 87.02 90.15 
Trade  1.45 1.41 1.73 1.75 3.17 2.56 
Services  1.12 0.54 1.42 1.52 3.20 1.60 
School Enrollments        
Primary  school  completion(<15)  0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.35 
Secondary  school  enrollment  0.80 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.91 
 
Notes: The sample consists of the 94 project and 95 non-project communes on common support as determined by 
propensity score matching.  Many outcome variables are dichotomous referring to whether the outcome is present 
in the commune.  The exceptions are: market frequency which takes the values 0 for no market, 1for once per 
week or less, 2 for more than once a week, 3 for permanent market; the % of households in various occupations 
refers to their main source of income; the primary completion rate is defined as the share of children 15 and under 
who completed primary school; the secondary school enrollment rate is the share of children who graduated from 
primary school in the previous year who are enrolled in secondary school.      40
Table 3: Impact of road rehabilitation/building  
 2001  2003 






















Market  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.88 0.04 1.27  0.09*  1.93  0.08* 1.85  0.09**  2.37 
Market  frequency  0.01 0.10 0.08 0.75 0.10 1.06  0.19  1.61  0.23* 1.69  0.25**  2.23 
Shop  -0.02  -0.23  0.01 0.01 0.08 0.50  0.03  0.43 0.08      0.57  0.14  1.12 
Bicycle repair shop  -0.08*  -1.83  -0.06  -1.01  -0.04 -0.78  -0.04  -0.91 0.02  0.37  0.03  0.60 
Pharmacy 0.08  0.99  0.04  0.32  -0.06  -0.31  0.14*  1.65  0.12  0.94  0.16  1.36 
Restaurant  -0.03 -0.97 -0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -0.28 0.05 0.62  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.55 
Services availability                  
Women's hair dressing  -0.04  -0.70  -0.07  -0.72  -0.07 -0.72  0.14* 1.83 0.18** 2.19 0.20** 2.61 
Men's  barber  0.03 0.49 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11  0.10  1.53 0.11 1.20  0.14**  2.15 
Men and women's tailoring  0.12  1.60  0.11  1.42  0.10  1.26  0.09  1.19  0.10  1.12  0.12*  1.69 
Employment: % households whose main occupation is:                    
Farming  0.04 0.62 0.05 0.72 0.03 0.38 -1.99 -1.26 -2.04* -1.67 -2.06** -1.89 
Trade  -0.05  -1.21  0.03 0.42 0.03 0.53  0.57  1.27 0.36 0.71  0.58  1.35 
Services  -0.06 -0.14 -1.54 -1.15 -1.03 -0.95 1.01**  2.51  1.68**  2.43  1.72**  3.10 
School Enrollments                  
Primary school completion(<15)  0.00  -0.09  0.15**  2.58  0.25**  2.82  0.04  0.91  0.17**  2.48  0.30**  2.31 
Secondary school enrollment  0.06  1.53  0.10  1.47  0.25  1.33  0.10**  2.88  0.05  1.41  0.07*  1.70 
 
Notes:  The sample consists of the 94 project and 95 non-project communes on common support as determined by propensity score matching. T-ratio of 
kernel matching is obtained from bootstrapping (100 repetitions). ** significant at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% level.  Standard errors of 
weighted DD estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of communes within the same district.    41
Table 4: Impact heterogeneity: Market and market frequency 
 
   Market  Market frequency 
   model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2 
1997 value         -0.26**         -0.27**  -0.30**   -0.30** 
       (-4.85)         (-4.81)    (-4.92)  (-4.86)   
Distance to central market/100          0.09                    -0.54     
        (0.19)                    (-0.48)     
North province          -0.04                    -0.35*   -0.44** 
       (-0.68)                    (-1.86)  (-2.87)   
Typology: mountain          0.19            0.18**  0.43    0.37   
        (1.57)          (2.27)    (1.23) (1.58)     
Flood and storm prevalence         -0.03                    -0.31     
       (-0.20)                    (-0.65)     
Population density/100          0.01                    -0.25     
        (0.01)                    (-0.08)     
Ethnic minority share         -0.35*          -0.27**  -1.20**   -0.94** 
       (-1.86)         (-2.28)    (-2.22)  (-2.50)   
Adult illiteracy rate          0.15                    0.54     
        (0.91)                    (1.04)     
Share of h'holds owning motorcycles/100          0.82            0.85    0.68     
        (1.46)          (1.69)    (0.49)     
Credit availability          0.39**          0.36**  1.16**    1.01** 
        (2.48)          (2.11)    (2.36) (2.08)     
Length of road rehabilitated         -0.02*          -0.02**  -0.04   -0.01   
       (-1.86)         (-2.25)    (-1.22)  (-1.20)   
Length squared/100           0.04            0.05*   0.08     
        (1.50)          (1.92)    (0.93)     
Months since project completion          0.02                    0.03     
        (0.71)                    (0.42)     
Months squared/100           -0.02                    -0.04     
       (-0.82)                    (-0.49)     
Constant           -0.13            0.22**  0.39    0.85** 
       (-0.19)          (2.23)    (0.18) (3.65)     
R-squared           0.37            0.35    0.34    0.30   
 
Note: The dependent variables are the 94 estimated commune specific impacts for 2003.   Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level of which there are 29.   T-statistics are given in parentheses. ** significant 
at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% level.  Market is a zero/one dummy for whether a market exists 
in the commune.  Market frequency takes the value 0 for no market; 1 for once a week or less; 2 for more 
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Table 5: Impact heterogeneity: Retail and other commercial establishments 
   Shop  Bicycle repair shop  Pharmacy  Restaurant 
   model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2 model  1 model  2 model  1 model  2 
1997  value  -0.96** -0.98** -0.84** -0.86** -0.71** -0.72** -0.66** -0.63** 
  (-10.02)  (-11.30)  (-6.05) (-6.06) (-7.03) (-7.63) (-5.11) (-5.98) 
Distance to central market/100  0.55    -0.79  -0.87  -0.76  -0.77*  -0.70   
  (0.94)    (-1.15) (-1.61) (-1.39) (-1.75) (-1.11)   
North  province    -0.32**  -0.32**  -0.01  0.04  0.07  
  (-3.04)  (-2.90)  (-0.08)  (0.38)  (0.53)  
Typology:  mountain  0.19  0.21  0.04  0.01  0.08  
  (1.28)  (1.65)  (0.49)  (0.13)  (0.63)  
Flood and storm prevalence  -0.38*  -0.39*  0.05    -0.11    -0.01   
  (-1.83)  (-2.02)  (0.41)  (-0.84)  (-0.04)  
Population  density/100  3.18*  2.79*  0.26  0.30  -0.57  
  (1.90)  (1.83)  (0.36)  (0.21)  (-0.30)  
Ethnic minority share  0.21  0.17  -0.09    -0.02    0.09  0.15 
  (1.30)  (1.24)  (-0.57)  (-0.11)  (0.67)  (1.41) 
Adult illiteracy rate  -0.52**  -0.53**  -0.50*  -0.63** -0.40 -0.42** -0.37  -0.37* 
  (-2.14) (-3.42) (-1.76) (-2.50) (-1.60) (-2.21) (-1.57) (-1.74) 
Share  of  h'holds  owning  motorcycles/100  0.40    0.45 0.43 0.67 0.69 0.10   
  (0.73)    (1.21) (1.20) (0.97) (1.15) (0.13)   
Credit  availability  -0.02  -0.06  0.16  -0.22  
  (-0.07)  (-0.32)  (0.75)  (-0.70)  
Commune has a market in 1997  0.22**  0.22**  0.10*  0.10  0.34**  0.36**  0.32**  0.32** 
  (2.44) (2.57) (1.72) (1.58) (3.81) (4.30) (3.29) (3.86) 
Length of road rehabilitated/100  -0.48    -1.29    -1.75  -1.45  2.23  2.39 
  (-0.33)  (-0.87)  (-1.61)  (-1.67)  (1.45)  (1.67) 
Length squared/10
4    1.21  2.87  3.57  0.03  -4.56  -0.05* 
  (0.38)  (0.63)  (1.18)  (1.09)  (-1.34)  (-1.70) 
Months since project completion/100  0.27    1.50  -0.30  1.03    -0.33  1.13** 
  (0.07)  (0.55)  (-1.15)  (0.32)  (-0.09)  (3.49) 
Months squared/10
4      -0.07  -1.69  -1.09  1.31  
  (-0.02)  (-0.64)  (-0.35)  (0.38)  
Constant  0.48 0.70** 0.54 0.94** 0.36 0.59** -0.43  -0.70** 
  (0.53) (4.20) (0.75) (4.50) (0.45) (3.17) (-0.46)  (-3.61) 
R-squared    0.58 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.48 
Note: The dependent variables are the 94 estimated commune specific impacts for 2003.   Standard errors are clustered at the district level of which there are 29.  
T-statistics are given in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% level.  All outcomes refer to availability in the commune.   43
 
Table 6: Impact heterogeneity: Service availability 
   
Women’s hair 
dressing Men’s  barber  Clothes  making 
   model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2 
1997 value    -0.75**  -0.72**  -0.82**   -0.82**  -0.76**  -0.78** 
    (-7.03)   (-7.56)   (-14.67)  (-13.87)    (-12.50)  (-11.17)  
Distance to central market/100  -0.87*  -0.74    -0.80  -0.72    -0.48  -0.63*  
    (-1.71)   (-1.67)   (-1.56)   (-1.65)    (-1.09)   (-1.82)  
North province   -0.26**  -0.23**  -0.15*  -0.13*   -0.14  -0.09   
    (-2.53)   (-2.49)   (-1.71)   (-1.95)    (-1.48)   (-1.31)  
Typology: mountain  0.21   0.18    0.09   0.09    0.26**   0.21** 
    (1.50)    (1.33)    (1.48)    (1.24)    (2.32)    (2.08)  
Flood and storm prevalence  -0.14    -0.05    -0.18  -0.16   
    (-1.01)    (-0.50)    (-1.40)   (-1.19)  
Population  density/100  3.68*    3.79**  0.03  1.26   
    (1.99)    (2.14)    (0.04)    (1.12)   
Ethnic minority share  -0.09    -0.30**  -0.30**  -0.29*  -0.30*  
    (-0.64)    (-2.38)   (-2.63)    (-1.75)   (-1.83)  
Adult illiteracy rate  -0.42*  -0.44**  -0.61** -0.57**  -0.51* -0.54*   
    (-1.87)   (-2.78)   (-2.66)  (-2.69)    (-1.76)  (-1.99)  
Share h'holds owning motorcycles/100  0.44    -0.15    0.50   0.57*  
    (0.97)    (-0.44)    (1.48)   (1.81)  
Credit  availability  -0.11   0.15  0.13   
    (-0.47)    (1.11)    (0.76)   
Commune has a market in 1997  0.23**   0.23**  0.05   0.05    0.09   0.09   
    (2.78)   (2.76)    (1.14)   (1.23)    (1.23)   (1.31)  
Length of road rehabilitated/100  0.77    1.15    0.88   
    (0.79)    (0.88)  (0.67)   
Length squared/10
4    -1.49    -2.23    -2.46   
      (-0.64)   (-0.53)  (-0.62)   
Months since project completion/100  -8.13**  -7.71**  -1.78  -0.31    0.02  -0.60** 
    (-2.13)  (-2.22)    (-0.79)  (-1.46)    (0.01)  (-2.73)  
Months squared/10
4    8.09**   7.69**  1.40    -0.68   
    (2.20)   (2.30)    (0.65)    (-0.28)   
Constant   2.39**   2.24**  1.35**   1.05**  0.81   1.10** 
    (2.54)   (2.57)    (2.33)   (9.50)    (1.36)   (8.64)  
R-squared  0.55   0.54    0.75   0.74    0.69   0.68   
 
Note: The dependent variables are the 94 estimated commune specific impacts for 2003.    Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level of which there are 29.   T-statistics are given in parentheses. ** significant 
at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% level. All outcomes refer to availability in the commune.   44
 
Table 7: Impact heterogeneity: Employment
   Farming  Services  Trade 
   model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2 
1997 value   -0.15**  -0.16**  -0.42  -0.30    -0.14   
    (-4.58)  (-4.22)    (-1.66)  (-1.48)    (-0.44)   
Distance to central market  -0.02    -0.07*  -0.07**  -0.04   
    (-0.25)    (-1.74)  (-2.16)    (-0.91)   
North province   -1.45    1.98**   2.48**  -2.10**  -1.76** 
    (-0.99)    (2.30)   (3.00)    (-2.57)  (-3.29)   
Typology: mountain  -3.37  -4.55*   -1.48  -1.89**  1.72   1.39   
    (-1.55)  (-1.96)    (-1.49)  (-2.73)    (1.49)   (1.30)   
Flood and storm prevalence  -2.95    5.31**   5.16**  -1.47   
    (-1.08)    (3.20)   (3.08)    (-0.57)   
Population  density  -0.41 -0.51**  0.25   0.23   0.22     
    (-1.37)  (-2.10)    (0.75)    (1.20)   (1.40)   
Ethnic minority share  2.01   3.11    1.31    -0.90   
    (0.90)   (1.66)    (0.92)    (-0.78)   
Adult illiteracy rate  5.01*   4.64**  -1.10    0.83   
    (1.87)   (2.08)    (-0.45)    (0.27)   
Share of h'holds owning motorcycles  -0.05    0.16**   0.15**  0.11*   0.11*  
    (-0.37)    (3.07)   (2.91)    (1.84)   (1.92)   
Credit availability  0.04    -4.69**  -5.22**  -3.85  -4.18** 
    (0.01)    (-3.78)  (-4.52)    (-1.51)  (-2.19)   
Commune has a market in 1997  -1.90  -2.12    -0.79  -1.02    1.60*   1.68** 
    (-1.09)  (-1.38)    (-0.95)  (-1.30)    (1.99)   (2.05)   
Length of road rehabilitated  -0.10    -0.01    0.02   
      (-0.39)   (-0.08)   (0.16)  
Length squared/100    0.10    0.20    -0.06   
      (0.17)   (0.51)   (-0.27)  
Months since project completion  0.46    0.46   0.49    0.19   
    (1.09)    (1.27)   (1.52)    (0.53)   
Months  squared/100      -0.45   -0.56 -0.59*    -0.21  
    (-1.11)    (-1.53)  (-1.76)    (-0.59)   
Constant   6.31  15.14**  -8.28  -7.37    -3.29  -0.56   
    (0.53)   (3.01)    (-0.89)  (-0.97)    (-0.37)  (-0.52)   
R-squared  0.27   0.25    0.31   0.28    0.17   0.15   
Note: The dependent variables are the 94 estimated commune specific impacts for 2003.    Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level of which there are 29.  T-statistics are given in parentheses. ** significant 
at 5% level or higher; * significant at 10% level.   The % of households in various occupations refers to 
their main source of income.   45
 
 
Table 8: Impact heterogeneity: Schooling 
   Secondary school enrollment 
Primary school 
completion 
   model 1  model 2  model 1  model 2 
1997 value  -1.08**  -1.09**  -1.16**  -1.24** 
    (-13.75)  (-14.62)  (-6.53)  (-9.21) 
Distance to central market/100  -0.28*  -0.32**  -0.32   
    (-2.01)  (-2.38)  (-0.60)   
North province   -0.02    0.03   
    (-0.53)    (0.41)   
Typology: mountain  -0.00    -0.06  -0.11* 
    (-0.04)    (-0.82)  (-1.85) 
Flood and storm prevalence  -0.20**  -0.20**  0.48**  0.45** 
    (-2.13)  (-2.38)  (3.47)  (3.60) 
Population density/100  -0.71  -0.90  0.65   
    (-0.76)  (-1.23)  (0.47)   
Ethnic minority share  -0.12*  -0.13**  0.07   
    (-2.03)  (-2.35)  (0.58)   
Adult illiteracy rate  -0.41**  -0.40**  -0.06   
    (-2.27)  (-2.36)  (-0.30)   
Share of h'holds owning motorcycles/100  0.47**  0.54**  1.01  0.89 
    (3.88)  (4.09) (1.67)  (1.59) 
Credit availability  0.04    -0.18   
    (0.49)    (-0.81)   
Commune has a market in 1997  0.02    0.15  0.15** 
    (0.91)    (1.66) (2.16) 
Length of road rehabilitated  -0.01  -0.01  0.02*  0.02* 
    (-1.25)  (-1.48)  (1.91)  (1.81) 
Length squared/100    0.01  0.02  -0.04*  -0.04* 
    (1.12)  (1.25)  (-1.85)  (-1.83) 
Months since project completion/100  0.44    -3.44   
    (0.65)    (-1.14)   
Months squared/10
4    -0.57    3.02   
    (-0.72)    (1.07)   
Constant   1.07**  1.17**  1.07  0.20** 
    (5.42)  (12.41)  (1.24)  (2.19) 
R-squared 0.76  0.75  0.50  0.47 
Note: The dependent variables are the 94 estimated commune specific impacts for 2003.    Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level of which there are 29.   T-statistics are given in parentheses. ** significant 
at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.  The primary completion rate is defined as the share of children 15 
and under who completed primary school; the secondary school enrollment rate is the share of children 
who graduated from primary school in the previous year who are enrolled in secondary school. 